

NSC BRIEFING

3 December 1958

PAKISTAN

- I. General Ayub, who took over from President Mirza on 27 October (Mirza had taken over govt on 7 October), appears in full command of governmental powers.
 - A. Ayub, now president and supreme commander of armed forces, not outstanding for strength of character or leadership. But he has firm loyalty of army officers and the ranks after eight years as commander-in-chief.
 - B. Initial domestic reaction to Ayub has been favorable.
- II. Military men predominate inner circle of Ayub's regime.
 - A. Three top generals in "presidential cabinet" to help run govt and make policy; other influential officers head martial law administration and have key command positions.
 - B. Prominent in inner circle is new army commander-in-chief Musa, only other 4-star general.
 - C. All army leaders appear to be working harmoniously, with no evidence of plans for counter coup. Ayub's supremacy could, however, eventually be challenged by military factions.
- III. After consolidating control, Ayub has started work on plans to "clean up" internal situation.

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- A. There are plans to overhaul constitutional, judicial, administrative, and educational systems; commissions have been organized to draw up details.
- IV. Pakistan's 5-year old pro-West foreign policy appears unaffected by Ayub's take-over.
 - A. Ayub says he wants "even closer" relations with West.
 - B. Regime has offered allegiance to Baghdad Pact and SEATO.
 - C. Increased US military aid, particularly jet aircraft, has already been requested.
 - D. Ayub has shown conciliatory attitude toward India, despite bellicose public statements. Karachi and New Delhi are taking cautious line toward each other.
- V. In governing, Ayub and his military colleagues say they will rely as much as possible on civil servants and existing administration.
 - A. Leaders say they recognize their own shortcomings and prefer to keep army out of day-to-day government.
 - B. Army's new political role could compromise its long held position as sole unifying and stabilizing force in Pakistan.
- VI. Ayub's most pressing problems are in economic field, receiving priority attention.
 - A. In pressing land reforms, regime will lose prestige unless it stands firm against pressure from landlords and breaks up large estates. At same time, however, Ayub will have to make major effort to increase food production.
 - B. Regime will find it difficult to devise industrial Program with incentives for manufacturers while holding prices firm.

1. Lack of foreign exchange makes it impossible to import enough raw materials to keep industry running at capacity.

VII. Regime also faces special problems in East Pakistan. Present government is less representative of East Pakistan than any since nation created.

- A. Population in East Pakistan is racially and culturally alien to West Pakistan and traditionally resent domination from Karachi.
- B. Political opposition to military regime is likely to develop faster and more effectively in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan.
- C. Underground Communist Party in East Pakistan, directed from Calcutta, has been especially active in planning future action against regime.

VIII. Regime's prospects depend on how Ayub meets Pakistan's problems, particularly the economy.

- A. Since most of the problems are chronic and because present leaders have little experience in dealing with them, Ayub regime not likely to be more successful than past governments in solving them.
- B. Failure will deprive regime of its popular support and would stimulate active opposition.
- C. Failures would also weaken army's loyalty to Ayub, and there would be an increasing possibility of a take-over by rival army faction.